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The Covid-19  pandemic represented a major event in world history, although its political 
character remains disputed. It is too early to tell what long-term impact the coronavirus will 
have on international affairs, but its immediate results are clear. The article examines the con-
text of the pandemic and some of the salient effects, noting that it has acted as an accelerant 
rather than a game changer. The paper then contextualises these changes into the larger pat-
tern of Russian foreign policy, noting the way that the pandemic only deepened and in parts 
accelerated existing tendencies and trends. International politics remain trapped between 
post-war patterns in the Atlantic power system and the emergence of new challenges, above 
all the nascent bipolarity between the United States and China. Russia seeks to manoeuvre in 
this new constellation, including by advancing its civilisational autonomy. Instead of introduc-
ing greater flux into international affairs, the pandemic only confirmed and intensified the 
existing impasse, and the long-anticipated multipolarity remains more of an aspiration than a 
reality. The stasis in international affairs remains in place.
Keywords: pandemic, sovereign internationalism, neo-revisionism, stasis, liberalism, informa-
tion warfare.
Has the pandemic changed the dynamic of relations between Russia and the West, 
and if so, in what way? This article will argue that the pandemic has not fundamentally 
changed the structure of relations, but it has intensified the modalities while accelerating 
the processes. In other words, the pandemic has only added features to a relationship that 
was already fundamentally broken. Contrary to some early commentary that the pan-
demic would provide an opportunity for some sort of humanitarian “reset” in the face of 
a common challenge, in practice the pandemic only reinforced existing divisions, while 
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adding an extra layer of distrust and bitterness. The article describes these processes, and 
then outlines a structural explanation for the continuing stasis in relations between Rus-
sia and the West. It will proceed in four steps. First, some words about the larger context, 
which locates the problem in the larger pattern of relations and identifies the specific dy-
namics of Western and Russian responses to the pandemic; second, we then look at the 
factors shaping the evolution of Russia’s engagement with the world; third, we analyses the 
impact of the pandemic on Russian policy; and finally, we discuss the character of interna-
tional politics today, including the enduring patterns of confrontation and “information” 
wars, that were exacerbated by the coronacrisis.
Stasis and change in the pandemic
The Covid-19 pandemic has been one of the four great crises of the 20th century — the 
Spanish flu of 1918–19, the great depression from 1929, the build-up to the Second World 
War, and the social unrest of 1968 — but with all of these occurring simultaneously. More 
specifically, the major epidemiological challenge of the global pandemic compounded the 
damaging consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008, increased the rising stress 
levels of great power confrontation, and fed the national populist revolt that powered the 
Brexit vote in June 2016 and then propelled Donald J. Trump to the US presidency in No-
vember of that year. There is clearly a growing popular awareness of the need for change, 
including in response to the accelerating climate crisis, but forces pushing for a transfor-
mation in international affairs encounter the institutions and ideologies of the Cold War 
era, entrenched in the form of a global stasis. Change and stasis are today locked in a 
stalemate, imbuing international affairs today with an enduring sense of drift and impasse.
Matters are changing, of course, and the pandemic as an event has accelerated these 
mutations, although the impasse endures. There are elements of transformation at the 
macro (global) level, but stasis remains at the regional and institutional level. At the macro 
level several cycles of history are coming to an end, including the 500-year predominance 
of the West, and new patterns are beginning to emerge [1]. This intensified the inter-
regnum in political affairs identified by Antonio Gramsci in the early years of the 20th 
century, in which he argued the old is dying but the new is struggling to be born [2]. There 
are indications of what the new world will look like, including a diffuse but identifiable bi-
polarity between a relatively declining Atlantic power system centred on the United States 
and the rising powers of the East, above all China. This is also a struggle between liberal 
hegemony, which itself is increasingly challenged from within, and a nascent Euro-Asian 
system of sovereign (conservative) internationalist powers focused on China. However, 
in micro terms, the dominant trend remains stasis — a type of equilibrium where the 
contending forces cancel each other out. The Atlantic power structures and associated 
ideology (the political West formed in the early years of the Cold War), strive to maintain 
their primacy against the long-term global changes in the balance of economic and politi-
cal power. 
Russia remains committed to multipolarity, and while elements of this have undoubt-
edly emerged, the pandemic has accelerated the trend towards the nascent bipolarity 
between the US and China. In the macro context, Russia strives to maintain its auton-
omy by developing Eurasian heartland institutions while exploiting developmental and 
geostrategic opportunities by aligning with China, but in micro terms Moscow welcomes 
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potential openings with the Western powers while diversifying foreign policy strategies by 
developing a network of bilateral ties with countries such as India, South Africa and other 
states. The pandemic accelerated these trends, but was unable to resolve the contradiction 
between the elements of innovation and stasis. However, at a certain point it can be an-
ticipated that the accumulated pressure of the macro changes will burst through the stasis 
at the micro level, leading at the minimum to a changed balance of power between liberal 
hegemony and the conservative/traditionalist approach to global affairs, and ultimately 
even to changes in the international system itself. However, in the immediate term the 
pandemic as an event was not enough of an exogenous shock to achieve either systemic or 
structural transformation.
The “West” as a concept and a geopolitical reality is far from homogeneous. As a 
concept, the political West took shape as a function of the Cold War. Until then the term 
was rarely deployed, and instead cognates such as “the Allies” or “the Atlantic powers” 
was used. As the Cold War intensified, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
was established in 1949 and the West emerged as the geopolitical and ideological an-
tagonist of the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War era the political West 
maintained itself in institutional terms by ensuring new functions and rationales for 
the Atlantic alliance, while also reinterpreting its ideological foundations. No longer 
focused on the ideational struggle between communism and capitalism, the new binary 
of democracy versus authoritarianism emerged. In all of this Russia was at best tan-
gential, and at all stages considered as something external and potentially dangerous. 
Russia initially tried to overcome its peripheral status by proposing a pan-European as-
sociation, the idea of some sort of Greater Europe that would automatically have made 
Russia part of a political community rather than an exogenous and threatening force, 
but in the event representations of Atlantic community prevailed. The pandemic in early 
2020 raised hopes that the enormity of the challenge, accompanied by Trump’s obvious 
denigration of America’s traditional multilateral ties and alliance system, could provide 
an impetus for a change in the geopolitical and ideational framework, but in the event 
stasis once again prevailed. 
The pandemic immediately raised some fundamental questions. First, would the 
world come together to tackle the crisis and prompt the creation of some sort of coop-
erative global community? Would cooperation provide a panacea for the ills besetting 
the world? In the early months there was some sharing of personal protective equipment 
(PPE). Russia sent some incubators to the US, and a convoy of equipment, including a field 
hospital, was despatched to Northern Italy. China also sent PPE to help many countries 
in distress. In the event, these acts of humanitarian assistance themselves became the sub-
ject of critique, and instead of alleviating the symptoms of crises, only made them worse. 
Like the virus itself, the response preyed on underlying conditions and vulnerabilities. 
Some cooperation on vaccine research did take place, amid pledges organised by the UN’s 
World Health Organisation (WHO) to support the Covax programme to share possible 
antidotes. However, even here the underlying distrust soon came to the surface, as the US 
withdrew from WHO in the midst of the pandemic, accusing it of colluding with China 
to suppress early information about the spread of the virus. Russia was accused of hacking 
into the laboratories of researchers in Oxford and there were persistent claims that it was 
guilty of spreading disinformation about the pandemic, undermining public protection 
policies while propagating the mystifications and falsehoods of the “anti-vaxxer” (anti-
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vaccine) conspiracy theories. In other words, in the face of a common threat, there was no 
common response, and instead the impasse was intensified.
Second, at the global level, the pandemic reinforced the already noticeable drive to-
wards a reconstituted bipolarity, this time with Beijing instead of Moscow as one of the 
anchors. China and the US “weaponised” the pandemic, accusing each other of responsi-
bility for causing and spreading the virus. The intensification of hostility was symbolised 
by the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech in July 2020 at the Nixon Centre in 
California, where he excoriated China for failing to change in the manner anticipated 
by the US when relations had been re-established by Nixon in the early 1970s [3]. China 
was no less robust in its response, intensifying its “wolf-warrior” diplomacy and raising 
the rhetorical heat. As in the original Cold War, other powers are trapped in the power-
ful magnetic field generated by the confrontation, and that is why the notion of a Second 
Cold War is useful. The actors are different, as is the regional and global focus as well as 
ideological orientations, but in structural terms some of the earlier patterns are repro-
duced, which the pandemic intensified. In addition, as in the First Cold War, international 
institutions are overshadowed and to a degree marginalised by the re-emergence of super-
power bloc politics [4].
Third, this entailed the marginalisation of medium powers, including some like 
Russia that had been accustomed in earlier years to acting as a superpower. In strategic 
nuclear terms Russia remains one of the few powers capable of destroying the US. Arms 
control, although battered in the Trump years, remains on the agenda, and managing 
deterrence will remain a priority in years to come. Other than that, Moscow’s voice 
in international affairs remains important, above all because of its permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council, but its status has undoubtedly fallen. This also applies to the 
former great powers in the EU, notably Britain and France, as well as to the EU as a 
whole. They all now have to make choices on terrains not of their choosing, a defini-
tion of a medium power. This is why the French president, Emmanuel Macron, revived 
earlier ideas, although in a greatly attenuated form, about rapprochement with Moscow. 
The Gaullist-Mitterandist idea of some sort of greater Europe stretching from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok was certainly not on the agenda, but Macron insisted that no major region-
al problem could be resolved without Russia’s participation [5]. However, the poisoning 
of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny on 20 August 2020, in the lull between 
the first two great waves of the pandemic, had catastrophic consequences. It not only 
undermined the already weak support for rapprochement, but emboldened voices criti-
cal of Russia, and threatened the completion of the “Nord Stream 2” gas pipeline under 
the Baltic Sea. The EU clearly prioritised its own development, even survival, above 
relations with Moscow. 
Even as the EU declared that it would become more geopolitical, the focus of geopoli-
tics moved to Asia, “while Europe has been relegated to the periphery, with its members 
squeezed between two poles” [6]. Covid-19 reinforced the perceived need for Europe to 
act as a stronger collective actor, in the first instance to help countries recover from the 
pandemic (and a multi-billion euro recovery package was agreed in summer 2020), but 
also in response to global challenges, above all China and Russia. However, the Navalny 
case only precipitated what had already been long in train. In response, the Russian for-
eign minister, Sergei Lavrov, at the Valdai Discussion Club session in October effectively 
announced the end of substantive engagement:
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Those people in the West who are responsible for foreign policy and do not understand 
the necessity of mutually respectable conversation — well, we must simply stop for a while to 
communicate with them. Especially since Ursula von der Leyen [the President of the European 
Commission] states that geopolitical partnership with Russia’s leadership is impossible. If this is 
the way they want it, so be it [7].
This did not represent a total breach, but it did signal that the old tutelary relation-
ship was over — Russia would no longer take lessons from the West. The old ambition to 
create some sort of “Greater Europe” had been severely damaged by the Ukraine crisis 
since 2014, and now the pandemic further reinforced Moscow’s shift to various forms of 
the “heartland” strategy devised at that time, intended to find “operational space within 
narrow mazes”, accompanied by a revival of the Gorchakov principle of Russian foreign 
policy, namely subordinating foreign policy (to the degree possible) to domestic develop-
ment [8].
While Europe’s relations with Moscow deteriorated during the pandemic, fissures 
with the US also intensified. Trump made no secret of his distaste for multilateral organi-
sations, and this included the traditional allies in the EU and NATO. One of Trump’s Na-
tional Security Advisers, John Bolton, described the EU as “worse than China, but small-
er” [9]. The EU retains its political subjectivity and normative commitments, but like all 
medium powers, it could only watch the November 2020 election as a bystander, although 
its outcome would profoundly affect the region [10]. Russia also was a bystander, even 
though the outcome affected Russia deeply. Joseph Biden’s win allowed the EU to focus 
on rebuilding ties with Washington and to re-consolidate the West, further marginalising 
Russia. Trump’s erratic and ultimately hard-line anti-Russian positions had been partially 
excused by the Russiagate allegations, but few commentators had expected an improve-
ment in relations even in a Trump second term, when the president would be free of the 
taint of collusion with Russia in the 2016 election [11]. “America first” was an enduring 
phenomenon, irrespective of the outcome [12]. In the event, Biden came to office with 
deeply critical views of Russia.
Fourth, this came against the background of a move away from old-style globalisation 
towards greater regionalisation. The pandemic accelerated what had already become ap-
parent — the move away from traditional representations of globalisation. This had been 
one of the main concerns of the national populist upsurge, whose challenge to the nor-
mative foundations represented an existential threat to the coherence of the EU. Europe 
was far more severely affected by the pandemic than China and most other East Asian 
states. With 60 percent of global population, Asia suffered only 15 percent of Covid-relat-
ed deaths whereas Europe, with less than 10 percent of global population, accounted for 
nearly a third of all deaths, and the same applies to the US. At the same time, China was 
on a much steeper V-shaped economic recovery path, with its economic output by the end 
of 2020 2.3 percent above its pre-pandemic level, whereas the Western countries all regis-
tered GDP falls in the region of 10 percent. At the same time, Covid-19 changed the way 
that businesses operated, with the emphasis now on shorter supply chains. This worked 
both ways, and Western countries tried to increase locally-sourced materials, while Asia 
reduced its reliance on Europe and the US. By late 2020 about 60 percent of all trade in 
Asia took place within the region [13]. The technology wars, above all over the construc-
tion of 5G networks, only intensified the trend away from old-style globalisation towards 
regional economic and technological complexes.
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Fifth, Europe’s marginalisation is most in evidence when it comes to strategic issues. In 
this context, there is no “West” as such, and even the Atlantic security system is not an actor 
in its own right, and instead we have the enduring bipolar relationship between Moscow 
and Washington, with Beijing occasionally thrown in as a new factor. This is all the more 
concerning since the pandemic occurred against the background of the dismantling of the 
whole architecture of arms control built up in the years of the Cold War. Already the US had 
withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in 2002, and then in 2019 the Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and in 2020 declared its withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. 
This left Europe more vulnerable, since the INF treaty in the first place was designed to free 
the continent from the destabilising effects of medium-range cruise missiles, whose deploy-
ment in the early 1980s had provoked a massive peace movement. Today, the threat of the 
return of cruise missiles to the continent has elicited almost no mass public response, dem-
onstrating how the civic sphere in the West is now more thoroughly permeated with a mili-
taristic ethos than even during the Cold War. As the negotiations ground on over whether 
to renew the 2011 New Start treaty for a period after its expiry in February 2021, Putin in 
October 2021 offered a moratorium on the deployment of INF on European soil, and later 
offered deep verification measures (on-site inspections) regarding the Aegis Ashore systems 
equipped with MK 41 launchers at US and NATO bases in Europe, and the 9M729 missiles 
at Russian military facilities in the Kaliningrad region [14]. Biden agreed to extend New 
Start for five years, but larger issues of strategic security remained.
The post-Cold War situation: The tide turns against Russia
How can we explain the impasse in which relations between Russia and the West 
find themselves, a deadlock which the pandemic failed to overcome. To understand this 
we need to examine how the impasse was created historically. In the interwar years Soviet 
Bolshevism was opposed by individual European countries and above all the US, but it 
was only after 1945 that the political West took shape and was given institutional form. 
This included the creation of NATO and what was to become the European Union in 1957. 
Together they make up the Atlantic power system, whose unity in the face of the Soviet 
threat became an obsessive concern, despite occasional break-outs from bloc discipline, 
as with Charles de Gaulle’s France. The struggle to maintain this unity became if anything 
stronger after the end of the First Cold War in 1989. Overall, in the cold peace years be-
tween 1989 and 2014 the unity of the alliance held, despite the absence of a clearly defined 
enemy against which to unite. Russia has repeatedly been accused of trying to drive a 
’wedge’ between the two wings of the Atlantic alliance. Objectively a return to fluidity in 
European security matters would give Russia greater strategic and diplomatic room for 
manoeuvre by allowing a greater variety of bilateral ties, and would give individual greater 
leeway for their own diplomatic initiatives. Instead, bloc discipline was by and large main-
tained. However, as the Second Cold War intensified after 2014 some countries, like Tur-
key, which had long been on the brink of defecting, gained greater room for independent 
policy making. Russia has certainly tried to take advantage of this, and despite numerous 
points of tension, the Moscow-Ankara axis endures, reinforced by the sale of advanced air 
defence systems and the energy partnership.
At the same time, the Atlantic power system became radicalised by the triumphal dis-
course of the “end of history”. The contradiction between the new opportunities opened 
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up by the end of the Cold War (the liminality of the historical situation), and the stasis in 
European security affairs (the absence of significant institutional and ideological innova-
tion) was reflected in the radicalised global ambitions of the Atlantic power system. This 
was expressed in different ways by the various actors (the US, the EU and NATO), but to-
gether the spirit was expansive and exclusive, squandering the apparent victory at the end 
of the Cold War [1]. The Atlantic power system was rebranded as the liberal international 
order, international economic integration was now called globalisation, and US primacy 
was called liberal hegemony [15; 16]. There could effectively be no “outside” to such a self-
contained order, and the ontological status of the “other” became problematic [17].
American regional hegemony took shape after 1945, but it was only after the end of 
the Cold War and the shift from bipolarity to a unipolar era that this regional order went 
global. With the rebranding of the Atlantic power system, a particular order made claims 
to a universalism that combined a justified sense that it had been the progenitor of a set 
of relationships and norms that were universally valid, and the rather more contentious 
claim that the power system in which these norms were embedded deserved primacy as 
a result. This universalism combined with the ideology of American exceptionalism to 
devastating effect. The claim of a particular order to be universal was rejected by the “anti-
hegemonic” powers, notably Russia and China, who insisted that the universal elements 
belonged to all of humanity rather than a specific power system [18]. Together they de-
fended a model of world order based on sovereign, or conservative, internationalism. This 
conservative or traditionalist alternative was clearly articulated in domestic discourses 
and official strategies, but while it resonated with other independent states (notably India, 
Indonesia and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement), it made little headway as 
a critique of liberal order universalism.
In the context of Western support for anti-Russian forces in the 2004 Ukrainian presi-
dential election, Jonathan Steele noted that “Ukraine has been turned into a geostrategic 
matter not by Moscow but by Washington, which refuses to abandon its Cold War policy 
of encircling Russia and seeking to pull every former Soviet Republics into its orbit” [19]. 
In the US, the Democratic Party regrouped “along the most retrograde Cold War lines” 
[20]. The assertion of American exceptionalism at home helped forge an enduring al-
liance between Clintonian Democrats and Republican neo-conservatives, and abroad it 
worked to advance American hegemonic aspirations. This is the context in which matters 
in 2014 reverted to accustomed Cold War patterns. Russia was once again identified as a 
hostile and threatening force, and was later joined by China as an adversary if not outright 
enemy. Russia’s resistance to the expansive universalism of the liberal order objectively 
turned it into a ‘revisionist’ power, to the degree that it sought to revise the post-Cold 
War order.
This was reflected in Trump’s impeachment hearings from autumn 2019. Ukraine 
from this perspective became the frontline in resistance to Russian aggression. The former 
National Security Council official Tim Morrison on the third day of the impeachment 
hearing on 19 November 2019 argued that “The United States aids Ukraine and her people 
so that they can fight Russia over there, and we don’t have to fight Russia over here” [21]. 
The assertion was repeated by Adam Schiff, the chair of the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, in his marathon opening statement in the Senate impeachment 
trial, arguing that “The Kremlin showed boldly in 2016 that with the malign skills it honed 
in Ukraine, they would not stay in Ukraine. Instead, Russia employed them here to attack 
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our institutions, and they will do so again”. In other words, Trump had to be impeached 
not because of constitutional infringements but because he was part of a Russian conspir-
acy to undermine US security, spread disinformation, undermine faith in US intelligence 
agencies and to “remake the map of Europe by dint of military force” [20].
The US defined Russia as a revisionist power, ranked alongside the “rogue powers of 
Iran and North Korea” and the “transnational threat organisations, particularly jihadist 
groups” [22, p. 25]. In macro terms this reflects Russia’s resistance to being incorporated, 
necessarily as a subaltern, in the expanding Atlantic power system. This is what provoked 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014, an act of insubordination that will shape Euro-
pean policy for a generation. However, in micro terms, this is a category mistake. Russia 
seeks to revise the European security order, not to destroy it. Russia is not a revisionist 
power but a neo-revisionist one, calling for changes to practices rather than to the interna-
tional system as a whole. In that context, the conflict over Ukraine can only be resolved as 
part of a broader European security settlement. This was the view of the International Cri-
sis Group when it argued that a sustainable peace in Ukraine “will require a dialogue on 
European security and Russian relations with the West”. “Efforts to make peace in Ukraine 
by solving problems specific to Ukraine only will fail, because the causes of the conflict are 
both local and geostrategic. A truly sustainable peace should address European security as 
a whole to make Russia, its neighbours and the entire continent safer”. It stressed that the 
war in Ukraine “is also a war about European security” [23]. While convincing in theoreti-
cal terms and entirely laudable in normative terms, this approach does nothing to resolve 
the contradiction between macro and micro processes, between liminality and stasis. 
The exceptionalist ideology was tested by “forever wars” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya 
and Syria until repudiated practically by Trump, and conceptually by the partisans of sov-
ereign internationalism. The prospect of change opened up by the potential of 1989  is 
eroding the post-Cold War stasis, but at a glacial pace until, we may assume, a sudden 
spring thaw (or winter apocalypse) will sweep all before it. In the Soviet years the Kremlin 
believed that the “correlation of forces” was moving ineluctably in favour of the USSR, un-
til it became clear that the power disparity in all major indicators except strategic weapons 
was moving the other way. Today Moscow believes that the world is undergoing a new 
redistribution of power, with the historical West weakening as rising or re-emerging pow-
ers, notably China, challenged the old balance of power. The “America century” is slowly 
dissolving, reinforcing old ideas about changes in the balance of power, but premature 
anticipations of American decline entail dangers of their own.
On the other side, Russian foreign policy in the post-communist era developed 
through four phases: from the eager embrace of the West in the early 1990s; to a rath-
er more cautious period of “competitive coexistence” in the late 1990s; moving on to 
Vladimir Putin’s “new realism” up to 2012, which sought to combine the previous two 
into a new synthesis of autonomy and integration; followed by the neo-revisionism that 
remains to this day [24; 25]. Despite his condemnation of the West’s “double standards” at 
the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin maintained the new realism approach all 
the way up to his return to the presidency in 2012, although managed by Dmitry Medve-
dev between 2008 and 2012 [26]. Putin was one of the harshest critics of Western inter-
vention in Libya in 2011, which he believed to be yet another example of the West’s post-
Cold War “crusader” mentality leading to ill-considered and ultimately disastrous “regime 
change” [27, p. 6]. Clearly, Putin was concerned that the regime change agenda would one 
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day come knocking on the Kremlin’s door [28]. More broadly, it appeared that liberalism 
needed an “other” to demonstrate its own virtues [29]. As one commentator notes, “Liber-
al democracy’s ideological providence needs a righteous foe to sublimate its own internal 
contradictions” [30]. The other, of course, was at first considered a temporary aberration 
until it became a “responsible stakeholder” in the liberal international order. 
Neo-revisionism repudiates that postulate. It is a strategy that does not question the 
institutions of the international system as presently constituted, but it does challenge the 
perceived hegemonic practices of the Atlantic power system in the post-communist era 
[31]. These four periods in Russian foreign policy are layered, meaning that they repre-
sent not only chronological evolution, but also synchronic accumulation, reflecting the 
multifaceted character of the Russian polity itself. The latest phase of neo-revisionism is 
reinforced by a culturally conservative turn [32; 33]. This creates a tripartite structure to 
Russian foreign policy in which traditional imperatives about Russia’s geopolitical great 
power status and the political autonomy and security of the regime is now reinforced 
by ill-defined yet powerful civilisational concerns [34, p. 16]. Putin’s speech of 18 March 
2014 defending the annexation of Crimea focused on problems of Russian identity rather 
than cultural liberalism [35; 36]. The theme of Russia as a state-civilisation fits in with 
broader discussions about the shift from nation-states to civilizational-states [37; 38].
This is one factor pushing Russia and China to align, although this comes with its 
own problems. Asked by the Financial Times whether he was placing too many eggs in the 
Chinese basket, Putin plaintively responded “We have sufficient eggs but there are not too 
many baskets to put those eggs in” [39, p. 9]. This was sober recognition of Russia’s limited 
range of strategic options, reflecting the deeper impasse, which the pandemic did nothing 
to alleviate. In fact, in what was in effect Biden’s 2020 foreign policy election manifesto, the 
Democratic candidate took a hard line against Russia, threatening “to impose real costs 
on Russia for its violation of international norms” [40, p. 73]. Biden also took a swipe at 
Putin’s comment on liberalism: “Putin wants to tell himself and anyone else he can dupe 
into believing him, that the liberal idea is ’obsolete‘. But he does so because he is afraid 
of its power” [40, p. 76]. However, Putin’s critique joins those who argue that post-Cold 
War liberalism erodes its own cultural foundations [41; 42]. Russia’s hybrid political sys-
tem reflects these ambiguities. Academic studies and polling data suggest that Russians 
remain committed to what could be styled old-fashioned liberalism: freedom of the press 
and expression, individual rights to property and personal freedoms, and the separation 
of business from the state [43; 44]. Liberalism as a model of state building, as practiced in 
the 1990s, is no longer the operative model and instead an activist state is used to stabilise 
social order and to maintain traditional values. The normative principles embedded in 
the constitutional state constrain the authoritarian impulses of the administrative regime, 
and neither is allowed to predominate. This duality is important when “dealing with the 
Russians” [45].
Moscow was disappointed once, and it will probably be again. As in the Soviet period, 
authority in foreign policy cannot be derived from strategic and military parity alone, but 
requires the foundations of a dynamic economy and society. Instead, the stasis in post-
Cold War international relations has helped create a profound stasis in Russian domestic 
affairs. Given the obvious asymmetry in power, the most that Moscow can hope for is 
recognition that it is a major power and hence it was in Washington’s interests to cooperate 
on issues of common concern. In the first instance this affects arms control issues, but also 
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the management of global crisis situations, above all the war in Syria and other Middle 
Eastern conflicts. In practice, the trend in the historical West is in the other direction, with 
Moscow dismissed as an irrelevance when it is not condemned as a nuisance [46]. This is 
a recipe for continued confrontation. 
Pandemic wars
Since 2014 a major “disinformation industry” has developed, in which the alleged 
knights of truth end up purveying their own forms of disinformation. In fact, to use 
Gramsci’s distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals (the former act inde-
pendently from structures of power, while the latter serve that power), so today there are 
plenty of commentators (journalists, academics and other specialists) who maintain the 
traditional ethics of responsibility and professionalism, whereas others play an “organic” 
role in defending the Atlantic power system against challengers. The Ukrainian organisa-
tion Stop Fake and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab are two elements 
in a dense infrastructure created to fight the disinformation war. They are designed to 
find incriminating material against Russia, and when it cannot be found, it is invented. 
This has little in common with the work of traditional intellectuals. They are an organic 
part of the propaganda war with Russia by presenting it as the source of disinformation, 
even when its ideas may be valid and reasonable. Instead, a narrow repertoire of standard 
formulations is applied across the board and with intense frequency, namely that Russian 
disinformation is out to undermine Transatlantic unity, Western democracy, and to sow 
division in society. It is particularly disturbing that established media, academic and think 
tank outlets take this material seriously, and in some cases major newspapers that pride 
themselves on fact-checking have fallen short of their own professional standards [47]. 
Instead of the common challenge of the Covid-19 pandemic bringing nations to-
gether, the war of hostile narratives was intensified. Even former president Barack Obama 
was drawn into the debate, tweeting that “Democracy depends on an informed citizenry 
and social cohesion. Here’s a look at how misinformation can spread through social me-
dia, and why it can hurt our ability to respond to crises”. He was referring to an article 
in the New York Times about Russian Covid-19 disinformation efforts. Dubbed an “info-
demic”, Putin was accused of playing “a principal role in the spread of false information 
as part of his wider efforts to discredit the West and destroy his enemies from within” 
[48]. In fact, the article was full of inaccuracies, quoted obscure troll accounts, and failed 
to consider the domestic sources of disinformation. The article represented “a laundry 
list of conspiracy theories blaming Russia and Putin personally for wanting to ’discredit 
the West and destroy his enemies from within”’ [49]. The article was unable to produce a 
single anti-science quotation by Putin. Bellingcat, a UK-based investigative organisation, 
warned that analysis of Russian disinformation “often lacks sufficient context and nu-
ance”, with the NYT article held up as an example of the way that comments on Russian 
or other sites are taken as representative of Russian state positions, and with a “little-read 
or obscure story” cherry-picked and “transformed into something far louder and more 
dangerous”. Above all, the author noted “While it is easy to imagine that every word 
that is printed in Russian newspapers is personally reviewed by Putin and a small army 
at Roskomnadzor, similar to Stalin proofreading articles in Pravda before they went to 
publication, the media landscape in Russia is far from homogenous. A common mistake 
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of disinformation reporting is to ascribe pro-Kremlin or Russian nationalist outlets to 
being the views of the Kremlin” [50].
Obama fell into the classic trap of blaming external forces for internal dissension, 
implying that an “innocent democracy is being subverted by shadowy outside forces”. This 
allows “the problems of the US informational sphere” to be framed as “a foreign disease — 
one that requires inoculation and informational distancing but little in the way of looking 
after your own health”. In fact, as the author of a perceptive analysis argues, “home grown 
disinformation is making democracy sicker than any foreign efforts can… The same fac-
tors that promote healthy democracies also promote the spread of disinformation”. The 
problem cannot be framed as “democracy versus disinformation”, since “disinformation 
is woven into the very fabric of the system”. In Russia as well, where there “a relatively 
free media landscape”, Chinese-style methods of censorship are less feasible so the gov-
ernment has pioneered new methods of “narrative control” [51]. Authoritarian systems 
benefit from the social atomisation and political disengagement produced by disinforma-
tion, and from this perspective putative Russian attempts to influence US politics should 
be seen “as a process rather than an event”. Above all, “trolling, strategic distraction, and 
disinformation is not something primarily done to the United States by external actors”, 
but comes primarily from domestic actors. This gives rise to the “democrat’s dilemma”, 
where attempts to check the disinformation that undermines the democratic discourse 
undermines the free debate that is essential to democracy [52].
NATO’s secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg accused Russia and China of spreading 
disinformation about the alliance’s response to the pandemic. He asserted that they were 
trying “to undermine the cohesion of NATO allies” by portraying the alliance as unable 
to protect elderly people or providing medical support and supplies. In fact, Stoltenberg 
insisted, “That’s exactly what we do” [53]. Meanwhile, the EU identified a “trilateral con-
vergence of disinformation narratives” being promoted by China, Iran and Russia. They 
were charged with a coordinated campaign for sanctions against Iran to be lifted, claim-
ing that they undermined the country’s humanitarian and medical response to Covid-19. 
The document, dated 20 April 2020, was prepared by the Strategic Communications and 
Analysis division (colloquially known as EU vs Disinfo) of the European External Action 
Service [54]. This was a follow-up report to one issued on 1 April asserting that state and 
state-backed actors “seek to exploit the public health crisis to advance geopolitical inter-
ests, often by directly challenging the credibility of the European Union and its partners”. 
The campaign posed a danger of public health and effective crisis communication. The 
report examined various stories trending on Russian social media, including the story 
that the “coronavirus is a biological weapon”, that it did not originate in Wuhan but in 
an American laboratory, that it was linked to 5G, and that the EU had failed “to provide 
urgent support to its Member States — instead, they have to rely on external support (e. g., 
Italy), with China mentioned most often as the source of such assistance” [55].
Instead of coordinated and cooperative work to overcome the pandemic and its far-
ranging effects, there was a battle of “coronavirus narratives”. In the case of EU vs Disinfo 
this is understandable, since it was under-written by the EU’s stamp of authority, and 
hence the material was used in numerous press articles. In the end, this only discredited 
the EU and reinforced the view of its critics that it is an organic part of the US-led Atlantic 
power system, and was not even able to establish a regime of traditional truth and profes-
sionalism in its own workings.
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These narratives include the view that “China can never be trusted”, because of its 
mishandling of the early stages of the crisis and possible cover-up of the true scale of in-
fections and deaths, that “it’s all Trump’s fault”, with his gross mismanagement of the US 
response, all the way through to the neo-socialist idea that socialised health systems and 
statism in general were more effective in responding than neoliberal market-centred strat-
egies [56]. Certainly, China sought to manage the narrative, stressing how it had practiced 
solidarity with other countries by providing aid, highlighting the importance of interna-
tional unity in face of the pandemic (in keeping with its broader concept of a “community 
of shared future for mankind”, in which China is presented as responsible global actor), 
emphasising China’s success in dealing with pandemic thanks to its technological prowess 
and social achievements, and challenging criticism of China’s response to the crisis and 
even that in some way it had incubated the virus in a laboratory in Wuhan or had allowed 
phyto-sanitary standards to slip in its wet markets [57, p. 37].
The pandemic: Opportunity, risk and stasis
The global crisis provoked by the coronavirus pandemic provided an opportunity 
for Moscow to re-engage with Washington [58]. As so often in the past, a common chal-
lenge opens the door to co-operation between states. This was most spectacularly the case 
in the Second World War, but also more recently after the 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda 
attack on America, when Putin immediately offered assistance and support for anti-ter-
rorist operations. In August 2013, in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria 
the two countries oversaw the destruction of Syria’s resources in this field. In September 
2015, faced with the onslaught from so-called Islamic State (DAESh), Putin at the UN 
offered a new alliance against the common enemy, an offer that was rejected [59]. As the 
coronavirus pandemic intensified, on 25 April 2020  the White House and the Kremlin 
simultaneously updated their websites to present a joint statement by the two presidents 
on “Commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Meeting on the Elbe”. It recalled the 
moment when the Soviet 5th Guards Army commanded by General Alexei Zhadov and 
the US First Army of General Courtenay Hodges met in Germany a fortnight before their 
common victory over the Nazis. However, the “spirit of the Elbe” could do little to thaw 
the entrenched confrontation, even when both countries faced one of the biggest crises 
since the Second World War. In other words, the pandemic represented a crisis and a risk, 
and although some trends in international affairs were accelerated, the fundamental factor 
was stasis. There appeared to be no way out of the impasse.
Nevertheless, there were some signs of cooperation. As the pandemic intensified in 
spring 2020 against the background of a plunge in oil prices, Trump and Putin communi-
cated more in a few weeks than they had done in the previous three years of Trump’s presi-
dency. Some opportunities were taken, but overall there was no breakthrough. On the 
one side, the US since 2012 intensified the sanctions regime in the belief that this would 
modify Russia’s behaviour. This was just as fanciful as the belief that personal engagement 
with Trump would change the stance of the vast military establishment vis-à-vis Russia. 
On some issues there was cooperation, as with the Opec+ agreement in April 2020  to 
stabilise the oil price through production cuts. For Trump this was a way of bolstering 
the price to save shale oil producers, who faced financial ruin as a result of the collapse 
of prices provoked by oversupply and the drastic fall in demand caused by the pandemic. 
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This allowed Russia to emerge as part of a new “energy troika” with the US and Saudi 
Arabia, but this did not insulate Russia from facing budgetary challenges as a result of the 
oil price collapse and the increased demands of propping up an economy damaged by the 
pandemic. At the same time, as noted, the New Start strategic nuclear treaty was due to 
expire in February 2021, and one of the US demands was for future arms control agree-
ments to include China. This was one of the items on the agenda for the mooted summit 
meeting in September 2020 of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
(the “P5 process”), proposed by Putin earlier that year but in the event shelved because of 
the pandemic. 
Trump’s long-term strategic goal had been to drive a wedge between Russia and Chi-
na. Washington increasingly saw China as its most serious long-term rival, accompanied 
by an increased awareness of possible vulnerabilities created by dependence on Chinese 
manufacturing and technology. This is why Trump launched a trade war against China 
in 2018, and why Washington banned the use of Huawei technology in 5G installations, 
and tried to convince its allies that use of Chinese technology in this field represented a 
first order security risk. The intensifying Sino-US rivalry reflected the global shift towards 
Sino-American bipolarity. Despite American blandishments, Russia was certainly not go-
ing to renege on its commitment to China, and in fact the relationship intensified. Given 
the sanctions on technology transfer and perceived security risks from the West, Russia’s 
5G development was largely driven by Chinese technology. The energy relationship deep-
ened with the opening of the Power of Siberia pipeline in December 2019, and there was 
now renewed talk of a second gas pipeline. 
With the intensification of Sino-American rivalry, Russia faced the challenge of main-
taining “equilibrium — not equidistance — between the United States and China” [58]. Rus-
sia denies that a new bipolarity is in the making, and instead believes that the shift remains 
towards multipolarity. The two models are not mutually exclusive, and elements of both are 
emerging. Multipolarity ensures that Russia, India, Brazil and other countries continue to 
exercise great power prerogatives. At the same time, the character of US hegemony is chang-
ing. The traditional Cold War model had been US leadership working through multilateral 
institutions and a ramified alliance system, as well as more broadly through managing a lib-
eral international order committed to a relatively constrained agenda of free trade, the free 
flow of capital and services, territorial integrity, and the use of force limited to self-defence 
and against communist subversion. In the post-Cold War years, flushed with the sense of 
triumph against the Soviet adversary, this agenda radicalised. The Atlantic power system 
(NATO and the EU) enlarged to Russia’s borders, while the merger of liberal international-
ism and neo-conservative exceptionalism inspired a new agenda of democracy promotion, 
regime change and universal jurisdiction of American norms. Trump’s election inaugurat-
ed a third post-war phase, which not only repudiated the expanded post-Cold War nation 
building agenda but also some of the core principles of the original liberal international 
order. It did not, however, repudiate American primacy.
For a brief period it looked as if Russia could become a natural ally for an America 
focused on its great power interests and mercantilist concerns. Instead, the “Russiagate” 
scandal, driven by the charge of collusion with Russia in the 2016 US presidential election, 
limited Trump’s room for manoeuvre [60]. Russiagate allowed the traditional Cold War 
concerns of the military-security establishment to block Trump’s attempts to break out of 
that paradigm. Any mainstream Democratic president would return America to the clas-
16 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 1
sic postulates of the Cold War liberal international order, and most likely also to elements 
of the radicalised post-Cold War version. In that context, there could be no fundamental 
rapprochement between the US and Russia. A limited new “reset”, like the original one 
launched by President Barack Obama in 2009, is possible, focusing on strategic arms is-
sues, but this is unlikely to broaden out into anything deeper. With Congress the gatekeep-
er on sanctions, economic, financial and technological pressure will continue and possibly 
intensify. The room for manoeuvre of Russian foreign policy is remarkably limited.
There was not much greater scope for initiative in Europe either. The rise of national 
populist forces was welcomed in Moscow to the degree that this offered a path out of the 
impasse, but while the populist insurgency has the potential to cause disruption, its ability 
to change the direction of EU policy is limited [61]. This would require a rethink of the 
EU’s policy towards Russia, and in general, a much stronger drive for genuine “strategic 
autonomy” beyond the constraints of the Atlantic power system [62]. Although some in-
dividual EU countries call for reflection [5], stasis predominates here as well. Governed by 
Federica Mogherini’s “five principles”, the sanctions imposed in 2014 are renewed every 
six months, amid fears that engagement would undermine European unity. Despite some 
moves towards “strategic autonomy” European security is ultimately decided elsewhere. 
The renewed confrontation in Europe continued as if there was no pandemic. On 4 May 
2020 four US navy ships and a Royal Navy frigate entered the Barents Sea North of Nor-
way to conduct what the Pentagon called “Arctic security operations”. This is the first time 
that US surface vessels had entered the area since the mid-1980s [63]. At the same time, 
some NATO military exercises were scaled down, but they nevertheless continued. A new 
iron curtain was taking shape across Europe.
Conclusion
The pandemic of 2020 had enormous epidemiological, welfare, social and economic 
consequences, but ultimately it did not have an immediate impact on the conduct of inter-
national affairs. The neo-revisionist trend in Russian foreign policy has been confirmed, 
reinforced by the long-term shift away from the expansive liberal internationalism pur-
sued in the early years of independence towards sovereign or conservative international-
ism. This type of policy is redolent of nineteenth century practices, and hence it is hardly 
surprising that the Russian elite today defend a nineteenth century type of liberalism. This 
understandably puts Russia at odds with the radicalised post-Cold War universalism ad-
vanced by the Atlantic power system, and even more against the expansive exceptionalism 
advanced by the US. In conditions of entrenched stasis Russia moved towards alignment 
with China, creating an incipient new type of bipolarism. However, Russia has not repu-
diated its commitment to its long-term vision of multipolarity, enunciated in particular 
by Еvgeny Primakov in the competitive coexistence phase of Russian foreign policy in 
the second half of the 1990s. To this end Russia affirms its civilisational specificity and 
seeks to maintain its autonomy as a centre of regional and global power. Relations with 
the component parts of the Atlantic power system remain strained, and because of the 
intensification of information warfare, the impasse has in fact deepened. The shock effect 
of the pandemic was not strong enough to undermine the foundations of the stasis in 
international affairs, and in practice only deepened divisions and great power alienation 
along the East-West divide. There is no clear exit route out of the impasse.
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